Facinating Facts about the Yamato

[Volorkey]

We all know it. The "King Tiger" of WaS. But it's still amazing to read about every time. I just finished watching a PBS special on Nova about the Yamato and I'd thought I'd share a few amazing facts about it.

Each of its main gun turrets weighed as much as a U.S. Destroyer

Its guns were the largest ever mounted on a battle ship. 18"ers.

Its main guns had a range of 27 miles.(So why does it have extended range 4 not 5?:confused: Balance issues probably.) The Horizon on the ocean is 7 miles away, anything beyond is out of view. I spotter plane would be used to direct the cannon fire. (apperently I'm wrong about horizon distance, I'm not surprised most of you guys know more about this than me anyway.)

The 18" round traveled at a supersonic speed, each round weighed as much as an automobile. They could punch through 2 feet of armor.

It had a speed of 28 knots.

When the ship capsized as it sunk the weight of the turrets simply ripped them from the ship. The 3 explosions from the magazines as it sank are believed to be the largest explosions at sea. The explosion was seen 10 miles away by departing U.S. aircraft.

There you go marvel at the awesomeness of this monster.

[Flyboy]

Thanks for the info:) I didnt know to much about the Yamato before hand so this helps

[Vlad_The_Impaler]

I think some one just finished watching a special on PBS on the "hotel Yamato"

eheheheh :D

[Imperious leader]

I watched the recent Japanese movie on the yamato in which they built a 3/4 size actual ship to shoot the primary scenes. I have it on DVD. It traces a couple of japanese soldiers and how they were assigned to this ship and finally died with it. The movie is kinda like the Titanic in a way its structured.

The shots when its sailing with all the CGI created people walking around made it look huge.

[RollingThunder]

I watched the recent Japanese movie on the yamato in which they built a 3/4 size actual ship to shoot the primary scenes. I have it on DVD. It traces a couple of japanese soldiers and how they were assigned to this ship and finally died with it. The movie is kinda like the Titanic in a way its structured.

The shots when its sailing with all the CGI created people walking around made it look huge.

What is the name of the movie?

[Outgunned]

Ya, i caught that Nova special, was kinda disappointed didnt really show or tell me anything i didnt know. It did help me recall some stuff i had forgotten about it but that was about all. Overall it wasnt bad if you didnt know alot about it.

[Imperious leader]

The movie is called Yamato Starring Takahashi Sorimachi and Shidou Nakamura

Its a real movie came out in 2006.

http://www.yamato-movie.jp/

sorry but im not making copies of my DVD.

[Joisey]

Range of her 18 inch guns was 49,960 yards.

Each shell weighed 3,219 pounds.

[Predator666]

Wow, that thing was a beast. What would have happened if it would have engaged US ships and had proper air cover?

Now that is a movie i want to see.

[Kaufschtick]

Wow, that thing was a beast. What would have happened if it would have engaged US ships and had proper air cover?

I don't know, but it would have been ugly.;)

[mikoyan]

I think the reason why the Iowa has range 5 instead of 4 is that it has a better fire control than the Yamoto.

[BasicBob]

Wow, that thing was a beast. What would have happened if it would have engaged US ships and had proper air cover?

Now that is a movie i want to see.

I assume you are asking about a confrontation between the Yamato and USN BBs. One of the biggest "what ifs" of WW II is centered around a confrontation between the Yamato and the Iowa and New Jersey that could have occurred on the night of October 25th, 1944.

The Yamato during the day of the 25th had along with the rest of Center Force attacked "Taffy 3" in the "Battle off Samar". The reports of the battle had reached Admiral Halsey in command of 3rd Fleet whose fleet had been pursuing and engaging the IJN Northern Force ( the Decoy force).

All of this was part of the wider battle of Leyte Gulf,surfice it to say I won't go into all the decision making and moves being made. But Halsey that afternoon of the 25th put together a force to pursue the Japanese Center Force. That force had the following.
BBs Iowa and New Jersey
Three Cleveland Class CLs ( top of the line light cruisers) Biloxi, Vincennes and Miami.
Plus eight Fletcher class destroyers.

The IJN Center Force had besides Yamato,the BBs Haruna and Kongo, BB Nagato ( a battleship designed and built right before Yamato). Plus three CAs and two CLs and at least nine destroyers left after the action of the 25th. That night they were making their way to the San Bernadino Strait.

They got there a mere three hours before the US Navy did. You can well imagine what kind of battle would have taken place if these two forces would have met.

A couple of old guys I once knew are probably glad that it didn't happen....or they may not have gotten so old !!!

[Cruizin2000]

The Yamato could fire OVER the horizen. That's scary.

C2000

[swarbs]

I assume you are asking about a confrontation between the Yamato and USN BBs. One of the biggest "what ifs" of WW II is centered around a confrontation between the Yamato and the Iowa and New Jersey that could have occurred on the night of October 25th, 1944.

The Yamato during the day of the 25th had along with the rest of Center Force attacked "Taffy 3" in the "Battle off Samar". The reports of the battle had reached Admiral Halsey in command of 3rd Fleet whose fleet had been pursuing and engaging the IJN Northern Force ( the Decoy force).

All of this was part of the wider battle of Leyte Gulf,surfice it to say I won't go into all the decision making and moves being made. But Halsey that afternoon of the 25th put together a force to pursue the Japanese Center Force. That force had the following.
BBs Iowa and New Jersey
Three Cleveland Class CLs ( top of the line light cruisers) Biloxi, Vincennes and Miami.
Plus eight Fletcher class destroyers.

The IJN Center Force had besides Yamato,the BBs Haruna and Kongo, BB Nagato ( a battleship designed and built right before Yamato). Plus three CAs and two CLs and at least nine destroyers left after the action of the 25th. That night they were making their way to the San Bernadino Strait.

They got there a mere three hours before the US Navy did. You can well imagine what kind of battle would have taken place if these two forces would have met.

A couple of old guys I once knew are probably glad that it didn't happen....or they may not have gotten so old !!!

Where is task force 34? the world wonders

[Joisey]

'The world wonders' was a code tag put on the end of every message that day. It turned out to be quite ironic

[swarbs]

'The world wonders' was a code tag put on the end of every message that day. It turned out to be quite ironic

Yeah, and also ruined Halsey's day I'm sure.

[Bigblue2]

The Yamato could fire OVER the horizen. That's scary.C2000

I think that most ships could. If you were standing on the surface of the sea, the horizon is only 2.89 miles away. If you were 100 feet higher than the surface, the horizon at is 12.25 miles away. :D

[mandt2]

Did the Yamato actually ever sink another ship?

[Cruizin2000]

I think that most ships could. If you were standing on the surface of the sea, the horizon is only 2.89 miles away. If you were 100 feet higher than the surface, the horizon at is 12.25 miles away. :D

I always believed that if you were in the middle of the ocean that the horizen was 25 miles in any direction.

C2000

[DSV1]

Battleships rarely fired over 25000 yards in reality, the actual ability to hit a target over that distance was minimal unless it was stationary, at anchor for example.

I Think the record is HMS Warspite firing upon an Itallian BB, possibly Littorio, also Scharnhorst and Gneisenau Firing at a British carrier, the Glorious perhaps, was at nearly 25000 yrds also.

The first ship to mount 18inch guns was HMS Furious, a Light armoured Battlecruiser, she mounted one gun forward and one aft. But after the disaster of the Battlecruisers at Jutland she was very soon converted to a carrier.

The 18 inch turrets were removed and mounted on two Coastal monitors, one the General Wolfe, the other's name escapes me :)

[TheFoeHammer]

Did the Yamato actually ever sink another ship?

In the Battle off Samar, 4 US Ships were sunk.

CVE Gambier Bay
DD Johnston
DD Hoel
DE Samuel B Roberts

It would be hard to credit any of those kills directly to the Yamato since Kurita had 3 other BBs, 6 CAs, 2 CLs and 11 DDs.

I do know that when the BBs were first targeting the CVEs with AP rounds they were ineffective since the armor was so thin it did not trigger the mechanisms on the shells. Once they switched to HE they had better effect.

Also during the battle Yamato turned away several times to avoid torpedo attacks. So it may have been some of the other ships that did the lion's share of the damage.

Here is a good website I use for details in Pacific battles

http://www.combinedfleet.com/map.htm

[Autarch]

Most battleships and cruisers could fire over the horizon. The only problem was spotting the splashes to adjust targeting. That's why many ships carried floatplanes to use as gunnery spotters. A US naval study before the war proved that spotter aircraft not only extended accurate ranges beyond the horizon, but also increased accuracy out to the horizon.

[BasicBob]

Most battleships and cruisers could fire over the horizon. The only problem was spotting the splashes to adjust targeting. That's why many ships carried floatplanes to use as gunnery spotters. A US naval study before the war proved that spotter aircraft not only extended accurate ranges beyond the horizon, but also increased accuracy out to the horizon.

Autarch is right on about the study. Thats why the Iowa class had spotter aircraft !

[BasicBob]

Another good website that examines the "Battle off Samar" in great detail is
www.bosamar.com . There is also other information on the entire Leyte Gulf battle and some good Pacific War information as well.

[BasicBob]

Yeah, and also ruined Halsey's day I'm sure.

He had alot of explaining to do thats for sure, but you must remember the prime directive for the Fleet at the time. At the time Nimitz had ordered that the IJN carriers were the main targets for the Halsey's Third Fleet.

You can also argue that the Seventh Fleet under Kinkaid had the ultimate responsibility of guarding the invasion forces and ships. And therefore it wasn't Halsey's responsibility to guard San Bernadino Strait, but the fog of war this time communications between Seventh Fleet and Third Fleet left Admiral Kinkaid thinking that Halsey had indeed placed units to guard the Straits. Fortunatey for everyone the sailors and airmen of Taffy Three proved to be enough to protect the invasion forces.

I think those of you that have any passing interest in WW II naval combat need to study the Battle of Leyte Gulf. It was afterall the largest naval battle in history !!! That may be one of the best things about WAS is it gets people interested in these events and spurs them to find out more. I hope so, cause the men of Taffy Three deserve to be remembered.

[Shrike]

I Think the record is HMS Warspite firing upon an Itallian BB, possibly Littorio, also Scharnhorst and Gneisenau Firing at a British carrier, the Glorious perhaps, was at nearly 25000 yrds also.


The Italian BB was Caio Duilio at the Battle of Calabria (aka Battle of Punta Stilo).

Scharnhorst is credited with the hit on HMS Glorious at equivalent range, approximately 26,000 yards.

[solitaire77]

Thats why the Iowa class had spotter aircraft !

Unfortunately for battleships, the floatplanes and their attendant AV Gas were the most vunerable parts of the ship. The ships were more effective in combat if they didn't have a spotter aircraft based off teh ship, but arranged a spotter from somewhere else.

-Greg

[Captain Gideon]

In the Battle off Samar the CVE St.Lo was also sunk as well.

Captain Gideon

[TheFoeHammer]

In the Battle off Samar the CVE St.Lo was also sunk as well.

Captain Gideon

Yes, but that was from an air attack by suicide bombers.

[Capt. Strange]

For a good book on the subject try:

Sea of Thunder by Evan Thomas

excellent read.

[Diamondback]

I hear The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors is good too. Need to check it out for myself, though...

[BasicBob]

"The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors" is indeed a great book. I highly recommend it.

[BasicBob]

Unfortunately for battleships, the floatplanes and their attendant AV Gas were the most vunerable parts of the ship. The ships were more effective in combat if they didn't have a spotter aircraft based off teh ship, but arranged a spotter from somewhere else.

-Greg

Yes they were and they were constantly getting damaged and outright destroyed during battle.Several occassions by their own guns ! Many a prudent Captain that knew battle was coming put his spotters in the air.

[Captain Gideon]

I know it was sunk by Kamikazes but it was still sunk during the battle that's all i was saying.

Also let me say that the Yamato is my FAVORITE Battleship of all time and i have many Yamato's in different scales,i now have 2 from the War at Sea set and i'm really pleased.

Captain Gideon

[boersma8]

Wow, that thing was a beast. What would have happened if it would have engaged US ships and had proper air cover?

Now that is a movie i want to see.

Well, of the three rares I have so far, two are the Yamato and the Iowa :) Like someone pointed out here: The largest guns were on the Yamato. Conclusion: They should have the longest range or at least equal range to that of the Iowa. Guess what: The Iowa has range 5 and the Yamato range 4. it does get a tertiary gunnery attack and the Iowa does not, but in a direct face-off the IOWA would get to fire at the Yamato from five hexes away with impunity....Hmmm, there seems to be an overestimation of US material going on here again...make it cost 80 or 85 points for all I care but give it the stats it deserves ( the yamato, that is!). An extended range of 5!!!!:mad:

[boersma8]

I think the reason why the Iowa has range 5 instead of 4 is that it has a better fire control than the Yamoto.

How do you know that? I'd like a word from a designer about it!

[zaarin7]

There is also Tin Can Sailor for the USN and Battle History Of The IJN for their side.

[trout11]

Range of her 18 inch guns was 49,960 yards.

Each shell weighed 3,219 pounds.

Hmmm.. Fascinating... That would be 28.3836 Miles.. So whoever said 27 miles and I was 28 miles away... I'd be dead.. LoL:D

What Japanese would actually measure that... Or was it calculated.

[Bigblue2]

Like someone pointed out here: The largest guns were on the Yamato. Conclusion: They should have the longest range or at least equal range to that of the Iowa. Guess what: The Iowa has range 5 and the Yamato range 4. it does get a tertiary gunnery attack and the Iowa does not, but in a direct face-off the IOWA would get to fire at the Yamato from five hexes away with impunity....Hmmm, there seems to be an overestimation of US material going on here again...make it cost 80 or 85 points for all I care but give it the stats it deserves ( the yamato, that is!). An extended range of 5!!!!:mad:

Well, at what point are you going to use for the Yamato's stats. If it was the end of the war, when the Yamato went out for the last time, her effective range would be less than the Iowas. If in the last several years, the Yamato sat in a harbor, and only put out to sea for one day, how ready was her crew to actually fight? :rolleyes:

If you were going to use an earlier time period to base the stats on, would you need a special ability to reflect the timidness of her captain? The trouble with making a national treasure out of the best in the world ship, is that, you can become afraid to lose it in combat.

[mikoyan]

How do you know that? I'd like a word from a designer about it!

Do you see the word "think" in my sentence? That means opinion.

The Iowas had a radar controlled fire control system and that fed into a targetting data computer. The combined system was one of the best in the war. This meant that the Iowas were pretty effective out to their range.

The Yamatos did not have that. While they had the range, they didn't have the accuracy.

Hence the 5 for the Iowas.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/b_fire.htm

and someone's conjecture on things:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/baddest.htm

And a testimony to the Iowa's fire control and computer, when they were being refitted in the 80's, they were going to replace it and decided against it because they couldn't find something as good.

[Big Kahuna]

On a clear day the Yamato or the Bismarck would be able to fire out to 5 they both had great optics. Nothing could take the Yamato's shell hit period.

Radar fire control in WWII, and yeah when was it used? How long does radar last after the first 3200 lbs shell explode? IMO, clear day optics was the only fire control that ever landed a shot above 20,000 yards during the entire war.

[mikoyan]

Radar fire control in WWII, and yeah when was it used? How long does radar last after the first 3200 lbs shell explode? IMO, clear day optics was the only fire control that ever landed a shot above 20,000 yards during the entire war.

Apparently never.....

Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
Main article: Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
Washington performed those vital duties into mid-November of 1942, On 9 November, naval intelligence officers learned that three groups of Japanese ships, one consisting of about 24 transports with escorts, were steaming toward Guadalcanal. One enemy force sighted that morning was reported as consisting of two battleships, a light cruiser, and 11 destroyers.

At sunset on 13 November, Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee, Jr. led out Washington, South Dakota, and four destroyers, and headed for Savo Island, the scene of the costly night combat actions of 8 August and 9 August, to be in position to intercept the Japanese convoy and its covering force. Lee's ships, designated as TF 64, reached a point about 50 miles (90 km) south-by-west from Guadalcanal late in the forenoon on 14 November and spent much of the remainder of the day trying, unsuccessfully, to avoid being spotted by Japanese reconnaissance planes.

Approaching on a northerly course, nine miles west of Guadalcanal, TF 64 was reported by the Japanese reconnaissance planes to consist of a battleship, a cruiser, and four destroyers steaming in column formation. Walke led, followed by Benham, Preston, Gwin, and the two battleships, Washington and South Dakota.

As the ships steamed through the flat calm sea beneath the scattered cirrus cumulus clouds in the night sky, Washington's radar picked up a contact, bearing to the east of Savo Island, at 00:01 hours on 15 November. Fifteen minutes later, at 00:16, Washington opened fire with her 16 inch main battery. The so-called (temporarily) fourth battle of Savo Island was underway.

The Japanese force proved to be the battleship Kirishima, the heavy cruisers Atago and Takao, the light cruisers Sendai and Nagara, and a screen of nine destroyers escorting four transports. Planning to conduct a bombardment of American positions on Guadalcanal to cover the landing of troops the following day, the Japanese force ran head-on into Lee's TF 64.

For the next three minutes, Washington's 16-inchers hurled out 42 rounds, opening at 18,500 yards range, her fire aimed at the light cruiser Sendai. Simultaneously, the battleship's five-inch dual-purpose battery was engaging another ship also being shelled by South Dakota.

As gun-flashes split the night and the rumble of gunfire reverberated like thunder off the islands nearby, the Washington continued to engage the Japanese force. Between 00:25 and 00:34 hours, she engaged targets at 10,000 yards range with her five-inch battery.

Most significantly, however, Washington soon engaged Kirishima in the first head-to-head confrontation of battleships in the Pacific War. In seven minutes, tracking by radar, Washington fired 75 rounds of 16 inch and 107 rounds of five-inch shells at ranges from 8,400 to 12,650 yards, scoring at least nine hits with her main 16" battery, and about 40 with her five-inchers, silencing the enemy Kirishima in short order and setting her on fire. Subsequently, Washington's five-inch batteries went to work on other targets spotted by her radar electronics.

This naval battle off Guadalcanal, however, was not all one-sided. Japanese gunfire proved devastating to the four destroyers of TF 64, as did the powerful Japanese Long Lance torpedoes. Walke and Preston both took numerous hits of all calibers and sank; Benham sustained heavy damage to her bow, and Gwin sustained shell hits aft.

South Dakota had maneuvered to avoid the burning Walke and Preston but soon found herself to be the target of the entire Japanese bombardment group. Skewered by searchlight beams, South Dakota boomed out salvoes at the IJN force, as did Washington which was proceeding, at that point, to deal out severe punishment upon Kirishima, one of South Dakota's assailants.

South Dakota, the recipient of numerous hits, retired as Washington steamed north to draw fire away from her crippled battleship comrade, and from the two crippled destroyers Benham and Gwin. Initially, the remaining ships of the Japanese bombardment group gave chase to Washington but they broke off action when discouraged by the battleship's heavy guns. Accordingly, they withdrew under cover of a smokescreen.

After Washington evaded torpedoes fired by the Japanese destroyers in the van of the enemy force, having several detonating in her wake as she retired, she joined South Dakota later in the morning, shaping course for Nouméa. In the battleship action, Washington had done well and had emerged undamaged, except for one non-exploding 5 inch shell through one of her radar antennas. South Dakota had not emerged unscathed, however, sustaining heavy damage to her superstructure; 38 fatalities; and 60 lying wounded. The Japanese had lost the battleship Kirishima. Left burning and exploding, she later had to be abandoned and was scuttled by the IJN. The other enemy casualty was the destroyer Ayanami, scuttled the next morning.

While South Dakota steamed all the way to New York City for major repairs, Washington remained in the South Pacific theater, based at New Caledonia and continuing as flagship for Rear Admiral Lee. The battleship protected aircraft carrier groups and task forces engaged in the ongoing Solomons campaign until late in April of 1943, operating principally with TF 11, which included the recently repaired Saratoga, which had taken a torpedo from an IJN submarine, and with TF 16, built around Enterprise.

Washington departed from Nouméa on 30 April 1943, bound for Hawaii. While en route, TF 16 joined up; and, together, the ships reached Pearl Harbor on 8 May, the Washington, as a unit of, and as flagship for, TF 60, carried out battle practice in Hawaiian waters until 28 May 1943, after which time she put into the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard for more overhaul.

Washington resumed battle practice in the Hawaiian operating area upon conclusion of those repairs and alterations and joined a convoy on 27 July to form Task Group (TG) 56.14, bound for the South Pacific. Detached on 6 August, Washington reached Havannah Harbor at Efate in the New Hebrides, on 7 August. She then operated out of Efate until late in October, principally engaged in battle practice and tactics with fast carrier task forces.

Departing Havannah Harbor on the last day of October, Washington steamed as a unit of TG 53.2—four battleships and six destroyers. The next day the carriers Enterprise, Essex, and Independence, as well as the other screening units of TG 53.3, joined TG 53.2 and came under Rear Admiral Lee. The ships held combined maneuvers until 6 November, when the carriers departed the formation. Washington, with her escorts, steamed to Viti Levu, in the Fiji Islands, arriving on 7 November.

[mikoyan]

Then it was not used again in the Battle of Leyte Gulf:
At about 03:00, Fusō and the destroyers Asagumo, Yamagumo, and Mishishio were hit by torpedoes launched by the destroyer groups. Fusō broke in two, but did not sink. Then at 03:16, USS West Virginia's radar picked up Nishimura's force at a range of 42,000 yards (38 km) and had achieved a firing solution at 30,000 yards (33 km). She tracked them as they approached in the pitch black night. At 03:52, West Virginia unleashed her eight 16 inch (406 mm) guns of the main battery at a range of 22,800 yards (25 km), striking the leading Japanese battleship with her first salvo. At 03:54, USS California and USS Tennessee opened fire. Radar fire control allowed these American battleships to hit targets from a distance at which the Japanese could not reply because of their inferior fire control systems. Yamashiro and Mogami were crippled by a combination of 14-inch (356mm) and 16-inch (406 mm) armour-piercing shells. Shigure turned and fled, but lost steering and stopped dead. Yamashiro sank at 04:19.

[Big Kahuna]

“The bottom line is that, after 1943 or so, having the world's best optical fire-control systems was largely irrelevant. The night battle between Washington and Kirishima near Savo pretty much settled the point; good radar usually beats good optics in a stand-up fight. And the radar used by Washington off of Guadalcanal was not as good as the sets fitted aboard Iowa.6”

What the night battle settled the point? The two USN radar controlled ships surprising a WWI battle cruiser, crossing the BC’s T, the USN battleships, only fired after the BC self illuminated at something like 10,000 yards and landing 9 hits for 2 in reply. Same action same night the two BB landed NO hits on the two escorting IJN CA and took something like 60 hits in return. The Washington running for her life at night could not fire and did not fire while engagment proceeded to open ocean against two IJN CA that came within torpedo range for a second time. So yes the USN used radar for POSITION but clearly did not use the radar to any significant advantage to land what few shells they actually managed to land. The axis BBs in question have radar that is good enough for positioning. I don’t know how many shells the IJN BC fired in total lets say 20, and landed 2 or 10% with no radar at all, and the USN fired how many primary shells for the 9 that landed say 60? More? Or 15%.... wow really great shooting on a two to one bum rush on a SLOW firing, no radar at all, completely surprised and confused, out of position WW I BC. How well would a single USN WWI BB with the best radar do against the Yamato and Musashi at 10,000 yards? Right….. lucky to get off a few rounds before the big boom…. At least the IJN BC did not blow up, which would indicate some for of effective armor and /or damage control. I would agree it is hard to actually blow up a capital ship at close range cause the magazines lie deep within the ship much of it below the waterline.

The whole thought process that a ship engagement is a flat board with clearly defined targets that could be ranged and fired on using blind controls basically never happened in WWII, no commander is going to start firing on blimps on a screen during an engagement battle and the axis ships radars are clearly able to help their commanders to position ships. Toss in flight time of shells out to 30,000 yards, the chances of hitting anything moving is slim, much less doing some sort of devastating damage. I think the BB should be allowed range 5 shots, but only against other capital ships that are unengaged.

[Big Kahuna]

Then it was not used again in the Battle of Leyte Gulf:
At about 03:00, Fusō and the destroyers Asagumo, Yamagumo, and Mishishio were hit by torpedoes launched by the destroyer groups. Fusō broke in two, but did not sink. Then at 03:16, USS West Virginia's radar picked up Nishimura's force at a range of 42,000 yards (38 km) and had achieved a firing solution at 30,000 yards (33 km). She tracked them as they approached in the pitch black night. At 03:52, West Virginia unleashed her eight 16 inch (406 mm) guns of the main battery at a range of 22,800 yards (25 km), striking the leading Japanese battleship with her first salvo. At 03:54, USS California and USS Tennessee opened fire. Radar fire control allowed these American battleships to hit targets from a distance at which the Japanese could not reply because of their inferior fire control systems. Yamashiro and Mogami were crippled by a combination of 14-inch (356mm) and 16-inch (406 mm) armour-piercing shells. Shigure turned and fled, but lost steering and stopped dead. Yamashiro sank at 04:19.


Hey great, we got a burning WWI BB, completely blinded, crippled, with no POSITIONING radar being bummed rush at 23,000 yards or about range 4? in this game, and despite the HALE of claimed USN damage the Yamashiro actually turned away and was moving till hit by two more torpedoes. One can only wonder out of the hundred of primary ammo spent that night on a burning crippled WW I BB actually hit as only a handful should have been enough to destroy her.

[mikoyan]

Look at the second example. The West Virgina opened up at 22,500 yards.....with radar and at night....

[dvang]

The Iowa has range 5 and the Yamato range 4. it does get a tertiary gunnery attack and the Iowa does not, but in a direct face-off the IOWA would get to fire at the Yamato from five hexes away with impunity....Hmmm, there seems to be an overestimation of US material going on here again...make it cost 80 or 85 points for all I care but give it the stats it deserves ( the yamato, that is!). An extended range of 5!!!!:mad:

Actually, although the Iowa doesn't have a tertiary gun, it does get a second shot with its secondary gun (Bristling With Guns SA), so in essence a tertiary gun shot. The difference is that this tertiary shot has to be against a different target.

[Big Kahuna]

Please don't post some sort of USN press release, the USN got a butt whopping and only a power failure kept the SD afloat as the IJN though she was sunk, the SD landing nothing, the Washington landed about 9 hits, the IJN landed 60 hits. The Washington ran for her life as to stay meant death. Both modern USN BB were fighting against prewar ships with no radar at all. I would agree that radar is very useful in positioning, but where is the evidence that it was useful in landing shell hits?

There are only two ships here right:

SD: landed NO hits with radar despite hundreds of rounds fired.

Washington: landed about 9 hits at near point blank range, and only against a self illuminated target that she clearly out classed and had far better POSITIONING. As far as I know she landed no hits on the two CA of any caliber. She runs having no idea if the SD is afloat and she is unable to target the two CA that chase after her.

[mikoyan]

I posted evidence. The least you could do is post a counter example without the preface of "don't post some USN press release". But hey whatever....

[Big Kahuna]

Well I'm sorry if you don't understand press release battle hype and a true after action report. As example replace the words "retire" with run for her life" and evade with "once in the lifetime luck", and "rejoin" with "thank God your still afloat cause we were sure you we sunk".

[mandt2]

Wow, why is this beginning to sound like some kind of heated debate?

Mikoyan's right Kahuna. If you think his post is inaccurate, then you should post a link to a more objective after action report rather than editing his post to match your interpretation of the battle.

Is it even possible to have an after action report for a battle such as this without most of the information coming from the USN?

[mikoyan]

Well I'm sorry if you don't understand press release battle hype and a true after action report. As example replace the words "retire" with run for her life" and evade with "once in the lifetime luck", and "rejoin" with "thank God your still afloat cause we were sure you we sunk".
retire is a professional word that you would see in After Action Report. And in the end, which ships remained afloat and which didn't. It seems that the Washington and South Dakota went on to illustrious careers and the Japanese ships they fought became home for fish. Same with the Leyte Gulf battle.

[BasicBob]

Wow, why is this beginning to sound like some kind of heated debate?

Mikoyan's right Kahuna. If you think his post is inaccurate, then you should post a link to a more objective after action report rather than editing his post to match your interpretation of the battle.

Is it even possible to have an after action report for a battle such as this without most of the information coming from the USN?

The direct answer is yes. It was even possible to talk to some of the participants from the other side after the war. The USN interviewed Admiral Kurita the man in charge of Center Force during the Battle of Leyte Gulf and in particular questioned him on his actions during the Battle off Samar.

[mikoyan]

One more little tidbit....
The US Lost 2 Battleships in the entire war and both those were lost at Pearl Harbor.

[swarbs]

He had alot of explaining to do thats for sure, but you must remember the prime directive for the Fleet at the time. At the time Nimitz had ordered that the IJN carriers were the main targets for the Halsey's Third Fleet.

You can also argue that the Seventh Fleet under Kinkaid had the ultimate responsibility of guarding the invasion forces and ships. And therefore it wasn't Halsey's responsibility to guard San Bernadino Strait, but the fog of war this time communications between Seventh Fleet and Third Fleet left Admiral Kinkaid thinking that Halsey had indeed placed units to guard the Straits. Fortunatey for everyone the sailors and airmen of Taffy Three proved to be enough to protect the invasion forces.



I'd be more than willing to forgive Halsey this offense, except he proved himself a bit single-minded on other occasions too, when he sailed right into a pair of typhoons (despite being told they were coming and where they were, and what he should do to avoid them, and the fact that sailors in the China Sea since the HAN dynasty have been able to avoid typhoons with just a barometer). I understand that in battle it is easy to have signals crossed, reports mixed up, etc, but there was kind of a pattern with Halsey of selectively ignoring things.

That said, I have no doubt that it was Halsey's leadership of the Naval Campaign around Guadalcanal that turned the tide in the Pacific, and that without his inspirational leadership the war would have been far more costly in American life.

[Joisey]

"Halsey acted stupidly."---Marko Ramius. :D

[Diamondback]

Another Clancyite?:eek: You've been "outed", sir...:D

Of course, so have I. lol

[TK421]

I recognize that radar was (is) not perfect, but the Duke of York registered hits at 10 miles employing radar spotting at the Battle of the North Cape. Thirty of forty salvoes were straddles with several direct hits, with 'misses' reportedly never more than 200 yards.

Source - Ogden, Michael, The Battle of North Cape, William Kimber 1962

[BasicBob]

I'd be more than willing to forgive Halsey this offense, except he proved himself a bit single-minded on other occasions too, when he sailed right into a pair of typhoons (despite being told they were coming and where they were, and what he should do to avoid them, and the fact that sailors in the China Sea since the HAN dynasty have been able to avoid typhoons with just a barometer). I understand that in battle it is easy to have signals crossed, reports mixed up, etc, but there was kind of a pattern with Halsey of selectively ignoring things.

That said, I have no doubt that it was Halsey's leadership of the Naval Campaign around Guadalcanal that turned the tide in the Pacific, and that without his inspirational leadership the war would have been far more costly in American life.


I agree Swarbs. Admiral Halsey deserves as much praise as he does criticism. You are also very astute to point out that he give very inspirational leadership when it was needed most at Guadalcanal. His decision to send in the BBs Washington and South Dakota to defend the waters around Guadalcanal when even his own staff was arguing against it showed at times he could exibit remarkable leadership.

Oh and his "selectively ignoring things" well they didn't call him "Bull Halsey" for nothing.

[boersma8]

Do you see the word "think" in my sentence? That means opinion.

The Iowas had a radar controlled fire control system and that fed into a targetting data computer. The combined system was one of the best in the war. This meant that the Iowas were pretty effective out to their range.

The Yamatos did not have that. While they had the range, they didn't have the accuracy.

Hence the 5 for the Iowas.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/b_fire.htm

and someone's conjecture on things:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/baddest.htm

And a testimony to the Iowa's fire control and computer, when they were being refitted in the 80's, they were going to replace it and decided against it because they couldn't find something as good.

OK. Sounds plausible..BTW I apologise if you misread my comment in the sense that I was criticising you or anything...I sure wasn't! All I meant is that you probably did not design the statcards yourself so I'd like a word from someone who was actually involved in the design process......

[Moderator Sinister]

I agree Swarbs. Admiral Halsey deserves as much praise as he does criticism. You are also very astute to point out that he give very inspirational leadership when it was needed most at Guadalcanal. His decision to send in the BBs Washington and South Dakota to defend the waters around Guadalcanal when even his own staff was arguing against it showed at times he could exibit remarkable leadership.

Oh and his "selectively ignoring things" well they didn't call him "Bull Halsey" for nothing.


The Japanese were pretty sure halsey would fall for the decoy, he more than any other commander in the pacific seemed to have the most hatred of the Japanese. It was rumored that he accussed the Japanese of "stalling" during the treaty sigining.


The trouble at leyte, of course, that carriers were to tempting a target, and he left, then right after engaging the japanese got the message with the code "the world wonders" and relunctantly turned around without inflicting much damage, he latered called it "his biggest mistake"

What wasn't know to Halsey was that his force he left at Leyte was really inferior to the Japanese central strike force but air power, a heavy rainstorm, and deception on the US navy part (they made dry runs on the japanese ships with no armaments) made Kurita think more of the defensive power of the US than was really there. Although Kurtia could have pressed the attack and made life a living hell for the army landing there the southern US force spent the night obliterating the southern japanese strike force by crossing the T and and a japanese success had really been lost there.

[wildger]

Check out this site: http://www.combinedfleet.com/baddest.htm

A comparison among 7 of the best battleship in WW2. There is also a lot of information about the IJN.

[mandt2]

The direct answer is yes. It was even possible to talk to some of the participants from the other side after the war. The USN interviewed Admiral Kurita the man in charge of Center Force during the Battle of Leyte Gulf and in particular questioned him on his actions during the Battle off Samar.

Well, the account we get is ultimately from the USN, even if they interviewed Kurita ro get their background. There really is no purely objective account, at least not what I think Kahuna is implying. It has to come from either the USN or the IJN, doesn't it?

[BasicBob]

Well, the account we get is ultimately from the USN, even if they interviewed Kurita ro get their background. There really is no purely objective account, at least not what I think Kahuna is implying. It has to come from either the USN or the IJN, doesn't it?

Yes it does. Where else ? Then historians can examine the evidence and make a more objective judgement. I don't see where you need anything more than that. If you want good history on the campaign for Guadalcanal then I suggest you read Richard B. Frank's book "Guadalcanal".

By the way Gawd only knows what Kahuna is implying (?). Because if you look at what he has written you can conclude that he believes that the USN lost the Battle of Guadalcanal on November 15th, 1942. That is the wrong conclusion to make. Every historian from both sides American, Japanese and any other who has examined this battle has come to the same conclusion. The USN won that fight that night.

[BasicBob]

.............................
What wasn't know to Halsey was that his force he left at Leyte was really inferior to the Japanese central strike force but air power, a heavy rainstorm, and deception on the US navy part (they made dry runs on the japanese ships with no armaments) made Kurita think more of the defensive power of the US than was really there. Although Kurtia could have pressed the attack and made life a living hell for the army landing there the southern US force spent the night obliterating the southern japanese strike force by crossing the T and and a japanese success had really been lost there.

What force are you refering to in the first sentence ? Please elaborate.

Kurita's decision on October 25th,1944 to turn back is as controversial as Halsey's IMO based upon what I have read. The intensity of the USN defence in the battle off Samar had something to do with that I agree. But the Seventh Fleet was in no position to catch Kurita and the Center Force. They had expended alot of main battery ammo during the fight in the Surigao Strait and nothing they had was a real match for the Yamato. So the odds were in Kurita's favour if he wished to be aggressive and pursue Taffy Three into the invasion area and hit the highly vunerable transports and auxillaries.

Also it is worth noting that a sizeable number of Admiral Kinkaids crusiers and destroyers were pursuing the remnants of Southern force away from the invasion area beaches and thus would be of no help if there was a battle with Center force.

[mikoyan]

Yes it does. Where else ? Then historians can examine the evidence and make a more objective judgement. I don't see where you need anything more than that. If you want good history on the campaign for Guadalcanal then I suggest you read Richard B. Frank's book "Guadalcanal".

By the way Gawd only knows what Kahuna is implying (?). Because if you look at what he has written you can conclude that he believes that the USN lost the Battle of Guadalcanal on November 15th, 1942. That is the wrong conclusion to make. Every historian from both sides American, Japanese and any other who has examined this battle has come to the same conclusion. The USN won that fight that night.
Not sure what he was trying to get at.

[Diamondback]

BTW, Dogfights: Yamato'll be on again in a few minutes, as of 0055 Saturday Pacific time.

[Big Kahuna]

By the way Gawd only knows what Kahuna is implying (?). Because if you look at what he has written you can conclude that he believes that the USN lost the Battle of Guadalcanal on November 15th, 1942. That is the wrong conclusion to make. Every historian from both sides American, Japanese and any other who has examined this battle has come to the same conclusion. The USN won that fight that night.

Dude that is like saying I had two pro wrestlers (insert 2 radar equipped brand spanking new USN 16” battleships built with enough STS steel to build the entire German Army’s tank force) jack some Grandpa at night in an alley (insert one blind aging WWI battle cruiser with minimal armor) and we were lucky the two local boy scouts (insert two IJN CA) did not punch us out after the fight because um one wrestler ran away and the other passed out into the garbage cans where the boy scouts could not find him…

The USN “won” the fight due to luck and radar, the SD was directly from Lee “rendered deaf, blind, and dumb” the last and final power failure actually saved her as the IJN felt she was already sunk. So right the USN with two modern BB did indeed sink an ancient IJN BC and thru complete total absolute luck managed to get away without one if not both BB being sunk. Go and get the point totals for the USN force vs the IJN force and game it out, the USN had overwhelming force, technology and position.

So your right, I don’t consider it a major victory and a proof of radar fire control considering the USN entered into this fight with one goal, with defensive positioning, with overwhelming fire power, overwhelming technology: RADAR, and barely managed to pull off the sinking of an ancient BC, primarily due to the fact the BC illuminated itself it one of silliest acts of command during the entire campaigned. There is no proof at all of radar fire control actually hitting any and all other targest besides the BC and there is massive proof that visual sighting landed far more shells.

Lets not lose the forest for the trees, I’ve stated before I’ll state again there is NO evidence in WWII showing that radar fire control would / could or did allow capital ships to fire on maneuvering targets at range, so I can’t see why the Iowa has a range of 5. Point in fact Lee could not target the two IJN CA that were maneuvering at speed at any range and even during his long retreat in open ocean not only could not target, he could not fire.

[Big Kahuna]

Wow, why is this beginning to sound like some kind of heated debate?

Mikoyan's right Kahuna. If you think his post is inaccurate, then you should post a link to a more objective after action report rather than editing his post to match your interpretation of the battle.


LOL, hey I’ve read many reports, chapters’ et al on this action from both sides, and that “report” above was one of the silliest, and so obviously inaccurate as to be near farcical. I leave it to you to find your own action reports and draw your own conclusions.

[Big Kahuna]

I recognize that radar was (is) not perfect, but the Duke of York registered hits at 10 miles employing radar spotting at the Battle of the North Cape. Thirty of forty salvoes were straddles with several direct hits, with 'misses' reportedly never more than 200 yards.

Source - Ogden, Michael, The Battle of North Cape, William Kimber 1962


This is the best example and nobody knows why the Scharnhorst lost speed and if indeed it was due to a long range plunging fire hit from the DY. What is know:
1) The DY had already checked fire
2) Soon after the Sc took two torpedoes
3) The Sc had on two other occasions, with no radar and no escorts, tried to turn and close for unknown reasons, insane Nazi captain comes to mind.
4) The Sc had fickle machinery
5) The Sc had more then enough critical damage to cause the sudden speed reduction
6) She may have been just plain lost or had assumed the pursuit was over and reduce speed to save on hull damage and or wear and tear of her fickle machinery.
7) The brits are always going to claim it was DY shell damage the won the night.
8) With all the radar ect the DY waited for visual sighting and ranging before opening fire and scoring critical hits.
9) It is unknown how many long range hits were achieved, but it was anywhere from none to a few, the DY took two? hits in return from just the rear Sc turret and several close shells.
So does this show that the Iowa should be able to hit with its full arsenal at extreme range?

We do know that some of the most accurate long range shooting was visual sighting from the BC twins and from the Bismarck. Other then that most capital ship shooting at moving targets, at range seems to be kind of abysmal no matter the type of radar and / or visual control. Insert here the IJN vs taffy3 or the Bismarck vs the RN shadow ships, or the USN vs IJN CA / DD.

[Big Kahuna]

http://www.combinedfleet.com/yamato.htm

"Both of YAMATO's forward turrets open fire at a distance of 20 miles. Of her six forward rifles only two are initially loaded with AP shells, the remainder with Type 3s. YAMATO's F1M2 "Pete" spotter plane confirms that the first salvo is a hit . The carrier starts to smoke. Three six-gun salvos are fired on the same target, then the fire is shifted to the next carrier. It is concealed immediately by a smoke screen made by the American destroyers.

0606: YAMATO continues on an easterly course, firing her 155-mm (6.1-inch) secondary guns.

0651: A charging "cruiser" emerges from behind the smoke. YAMATO engages her from a distance of more than 10 miles and scores a hit with the first salvo. The target is seen burning before it is lost sight of."

It would seem that Yamato did OK with range fire too.. even against what was a DD at 10 miles.

[Dragonman505]

Hello again, The horizon at sea (from just above the water line) is 11 miles. The higher up the ship's structure you go the further away that becomes.

[Big Kahuna]

I don't know how long a block is in this game but say it is 5,000 yards or 15,000 feet or 3 miles. Rage 5 would then be 75,000 to 100,000 feet, 15 to 18 miles, or 25,000 to 30,000 yards.

For a BB, really anything below 15,000 yards is direct fire, ie you are firing at a silhouette and leading such by a certain distance reflective or range and target speed, but no / little compensation is being given for shell fall. Between 15,000 and 25,000 feet there is some combinations of calculations, above 25,000 feet you are area firing at a spot in the water that the target maybe in sometime in the future, leading the target by up to a MILE . Giving new meaning to the words “miss by a mile”. Hits at long range are far less probably, but could be far deadlier due to deck penetration. Due to the long lead times, the faster, smaller and more maneuverable the targets are the chances of hitting them falls to near zero. In could indeed see long range fire in this game, I can’t see how it could hit smaller ships and I can’t see how it could be anywhere near as effective as closer range firing. IMO a rules fix could be at range 5, no normal damage is dealt but there is still a chance of critical damage on capital ships, AND normal / critical damage can be done on all crippled / slow ships. This would IMO make a long range shot more palatable. Right now you can sit the Iowa on the center objective and pretty much blast anything trying to take the two other objectives, which in my case is some poor banzai DD…

[TK421]

This is the best example and nobody knows why the Scharnhorst lost speed and if indeed it was due to a long range plunging fire hit from the DY. What is know:
1) The DY had already checked fire
2) Soon after the Sc took two torpedoes
3) The Sc had on two other occasions, with no radar and no escorts, tried to turn and close for unknown reasons, insane Nazi captain comes to mind.
4) The Sc had fickle machinery
5) The Sc had more then enough critical damage to cause the sudden speed reduction
6) She may have been just plain lost or had assumed the pursuit was over and reduce speed to save on hull damage and or wear and tear of her fickle machinery.
7) The brits are always going to claim it was DY shell damage the won the night.
8) With all the radar ect the DY waited for visual sighting and ranging before opening fire and scoring critical hits.
9) It is unknown how many long range hits were achieved, but it was anywhere from none to a few, the DY took two? hits in return from just the rear Sc turret and several close shells.
So does this show that the Iowa should be able to hit with its full arsenal at extreme range?

We do know that some of the most accurate long range shooting was visual sighting from the BC twins and from the Bismarck. Other then that most capital ship shooting at moving targets, at range seems to be kind of abysmal no matter the type of radar and / or visual control. Insert here the IJN vs taffy3 or the Bismarck vs the RN shadow ships, or the USN vs IJN CA / DD.

The North Cape action as a whole is interesting, but I will stay on the issue of the Duke of York's gunnery. According to my source, there are two indications of a hit from the Duke of York causing the Scharnhorst to slow down. At 1815 hours, before any torpedo hits had been registered (the destroyers and cruisers could not catch her), a message from the Scharnhorst was intercepted indicating accurate enemy fire at 19,000 metres (and also mentioning that the enemy fire was radar-directed). At the same time, the radar plot showed Scharnhorst reducing speed. The destroyers caught up, hit the Scharnhorst with torpedos and the Duke of York plus two cruisers also came up and engaged with gunfire again.

[Big Kahuna]

right and I can find a source that shows the DY had already checked fire and was about to return to escourt when the Sc reduced speed. Who really knows, maybe she cut some speed to turn into the T of the CA / DD after her so she could get a few broadsides in.

http://www.mikekemble.com/ww2/scharnhorst.html

"In another straddle the main mast was hit causing the temporary loss of the Type 281 air warning radar set and Admiral Fraser's barge got wrecked! However, Scharnhorst was, yet again, showing signs of getting away as she began to open up the range. By 1717 hrs she was out of visual range of the Duke of York who continued firing by radar. At 1824 hrs the Battleship stopped firing. Fraser signalled to Burnett that he was going to remain with the convoy as they had no chance of closing the Scharnhorst. Suddenly the range counters which had ben rapidly clicking up the range between the ships started to slow down, then showed that they were again closing with the target - Scharnhorst was slowing down! The Royal Navy began gaining on her as the range counters started to decrease the distances between them and the target. It is quite possible that they caught the Scharnhorst napping for the fourth incredible time that day. It was thought possible that the Scharnhorst had either switched off her radar, so that the Royal Navy could not detect the emissions, or that it was out of order. But survivors later picked up recalled that announcements were heard about contacts to starboard. But nobody ordered the main guns to be trained in that direction and indeed, when the alarm sounded, most of her gun crews were stood down!"

[TK421]

Unless I am reading it wrong your own source seems to credit the decrease in speeed from 29 to 22 knots to a 14 inch shell fired at long range hitting a boiler room. It also matches my source with mention of a 14 inch shell hitting A turret at the same time. That makes two hits at approximately 20,000 yards by radar-directed guns.

The radar had been repaired and salvoes fired, with 1800 hrs being the estimated time in my source. The intercept from the Scharnhorst reported accurate long range fire was received at 1815, allowing for some time for translation and re-transmission.

Still, I grant that I cannot provide hard evidence beyond written sources, and that written sources can be contradicted. My readings lead me to believe that radar-directed gunnery was successful that night, and I recognize that that is not truth.

The Scharnhorst story is both stirring and tragic regardless of what side one is viewing it. Very few of her crew survived that night and none of her officers survived, making it hard to reconstruct the details from the German point of view. Admiral Fraser passed the site a few days later and paraded guard of honour for the lost crew while throwing a wreath in their honour.

[Diamondback]

There was a line in The Hunt for Red October that's appropriate here:

"The sea... well, she tries to kill us all no matter what flag we fly."

[Big Kahuna]

my source posted says the DY had already checked fire, the Sc, stood down her gun crew and decreased speed.. then got pasted by 14" rounds. Most other sources say she was pasted by 14" then slowed down.... huge difference there.

[mandt2]

LOL, hey I’ve read many reports, chapters’ et al on this action from both sides, and that “report” above was one of the silliest, and so obviously inaccurate as to be near farcical. I leave it to you to find your own action reports and draw your own conclusions.

This response does not surprise me. So you don't have any links or can post any quotes to support your angle on this? That's too bad.

[Moderator Sinister]

What force are you refering to in the first sentence ? Please elaborate.

Kurita's decision on October 25th,1944 to turn back is as controversial as Halsey's IMO based upon what I have read. The intensity of the USN defence in the battle off Samar had something to do with that I agree. But the Seventh Fleet was in no position to catch Kurita and the Center Force. They had expended alot of main battery ammo during the fight in the Surigao Strait and nothing they had was a real match for the Yamato. So the odds were in Kurita's favour if he wished to be aggressive and pursue Taffy Three into the invasion area and hit the highly vunerable transports and auxillaries.

Also it is worth noting that a sizeable number of Admiral Kinkaids crusiers and destroyers were pursuing the remnants of Southern force away from the invasion area beaches and thus would be of no help if there was a battle with Center force.

What I mean to say is that had the southern strike force been successful things would have been really bad for the americans, as it was the japanese were caught with their pants down coming through the strait.

[Big Kahuna]

yep and given me the flip side of the map AND some PT boats and some good easy night rules and I'm ready to roll the dice.

[TK421]

my source posted says the DY had already checked fire, the Sc, stood down her gun crew and decreased speed.. then got pasted by 14" rounds. Most other sources say she was pasted by 14" then slowed down.... huge difference there.

Your source says this in the paragraph after the one you quoted:

"Scharnhorst's speed fell down after a 14 inch shell hit the starboard side and put a boiler out of action. It was recalled on the bridge of the Scharnhorst that the speed "dropped from 29 knots down to 22 knots rapidly."

I agree that the Yamato seems to get short-changed, but I think that radar-directed gunnery did achieve results in the war.

[Big Kahuna]

Just about all sources say that at 18:20 the Sc lost speed from say 31 knots, most British sources will claim it was because of a long ranged hit that is not documented, the Sc site says we don’t know but the DY had checked fire and the Sc had stood down her gun crews. We all know and it is well documented that soon after the Sc had its B turret and boiler room blown out. As stated before the Brits will always claim it was a shell hit that had a delayed effect, and a few others will just think humm, probably just one more poor judgment in a string of mistakes by Sc. In all cases we are talking around 20,000 yards, not 25,000 to 30,000. So the point of radar being used to fling a shot that far is as stated before not shown by any historical case. Now visual firing has been shown to work.. After 53 radar controled broadsides from 15,000 to 20,000 the DY scored one or two hits, that is about 3 game turns at range 3 or barely 4 in game turns. Which I don't have a problem with, I have a problem with range 5.



http://www.scharnhorst-class.dk/scharnhorst/history/scharnostfront.html

[TomJag3]

Another tidbit about the Yamato class ships: They had an AA shell for their 18" guns, as did Iowa and Rodney. The first time that Musashi fired one, it burst the barrel. Musashi isn't the only battleship to have burst a barrel. The Richelieu lost one while fighting the Barham due to the wrong type of charge.

[horacus]

Thanks for the info:) I didnt know to much about the Yamato before hand so this helps

Me neither. Thanks for the info.

[Big Kahuna]

The Bismarck blew a rear gun tube also, maybe the ammo, maybe there were fragments inside the gun, the French has a problem with the cap and the shell could be used in gas attacks, the US fixed the problem.

The Yamato / Musashi's round was like the anti-airfield round used in the early 42 SP effort. A timmed blast that would spread hundreds of smaller sub ammor that would explode. How well would a Shinano turret work firing the same round over a USNMC invasion force..... ouch.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=51264


"There is excellent technical detail and scale cross-sections of the San-Shiki shell in Janusz Skulski's The Battleship Yamato (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1988), page 114.

Sorry I don't have a scanner to put it up, but it describes the 46cm San-Shiki AA common projectile Model 3. Weight 1360kg, containing 1500 incendiary fragments.

In much the same form as the 46cm shell, except for its wood-filled ogive and eight tiers of the fragments behind it down to the charges at the base for delay, scatter, and bursting.

Each fragment was a hollow steel cylinder 90mm long x 25mm dia filled with rubber thermite and ignited through holes at both ends.

There is no mention of special marking or coloring to distinguish it from other rounds, although it was studded with fuzes reaching six each into the tiers of fragments.

How often could Yamato have fired the Beehive rounds for gunners to know how their bands hurt the barrels? Considering how relatively seldom she fired her main guns during the War. At least the latter were probably named for the sound it made, but I've never heard what sound the Japanese shells made.

Similar incendiary fragment AA rounds were fired against US B-24s and B-29s, but with negligible effect. I wonder if these were the same type of e fired at all in general. It's interesting that they were called "Beehive" like the American antipersonnel flechette artillery round from the Vietnam War. At least the latter were probably named for the sound it made, but I've never heard what sound the Japanese shells made.

Similar incendiary fragment AA rounds were fired against US B-24 and B-29s, but with negligible effect. I wonder if these were the same type of fragments. Airmen reported that they made attractive patterns when they burst, but little else. "

[TomJag3]

Here's a site with everything you ever wanted to know about naval ordinance*

* but were afraid to ask.

It includes turret elevations, so some of the ships were unable to fire as far at their guns' maximum distance because the turrets did not allow enough elevation. It also covers shell penetration and rate of fire. The Iowa had nearly the same penetration as the Yamato because of the 'heavy' shells they used. The Baltimores also had greater penetration than your average 8" gun because of the weight of the shell.

http://www.navweaps.com/

[Volorkey]

Ok so I was wrong about Horizon distance. However I don't see how it matters much my point was the Yamato could fire FAR beyond the horizon.

[Big Kahuna]

not only fire but get hits, just about all hits above 20,000 yards were visual. The DY fired 56 broadsides from 12,000 to 20,000 yards and got anywhere from 1 to 4 hits with radar fire control. Hence my contention that the Yamato and Bismarck's VISUAL range finding were much better at scoring hits then any "radar fire control" and it would be upto the radar guys to show where it came into play, which it did NOT in WWII, especially if you are looking at ranged fire from 25000 yards up. These are ALL visual fire.

[mikoyan]

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-086.htm

Comparison of optical to radar systems.

[Big Kahuna]

thanks great read, don't know what it all meant. hehe, like the poor IJN system landed FAR more hits in 42 and the Yamato was strandling and landing at very long ranges, while the south force USN BB landed few of the hundred and hundreds of primary rounds fired on a burning IJN BB with our great system, so little in fact the BB was still moving until hit with two more fish... dunno but real world performance is what lands shells on ships and that was all visual...

[Wulfram]

Did you know, some research shows that the Yamato probably sank two to three hours before she really would have if she had had another mission?

1) Japanese records show that the Yamato's magazines were full to capacity with HE rounds for use on Okinawa.

2) At the recorded time of the explosion that destroyed her (and several planes flying nearby), that she was listing approximately 23 degrees.

3) Detailed drawing of her magazine room showed that if you tilt the room to 23 degrees the top round in the magazine rack FALLS OUT! Opppsss, slight design flaw there.

4) If this were to happen, in let's say her 6" magazine, located under "B" Turret (and fairly close to her 18" magazine room). It likely could have set of both magazines.

I read this in a Warships magazine about twenty years ago. Mind you, it is all a mute point, it just meant that more American airman would have had target practice on her. I just find it amazing all the punishment that ship could take only to have a design flaw actually be her demise. (and she only have 6 hull points! Not that I mind, she is hard enough for my French fleet to handle anyway!)

-W

[TK421]

The articles were good reads. Of note is the progression in radar sets.

The 1942 engagement from Washington was with the Mk 3 set. The battleships at Surigao Strait had a variety of radars. The three battleships with Mk 8 radars did the lion share of the shooting, and starting at 22,800 yards they certainly hit the Yamashiro. The Yamashiro sunk less than 30 minutes after being engaged (I cannot find any records of torpedo shots after the gun battle was joined).

The Mk 3 is credited with having the ability to range splashes at 20,000 yards, the Mk 8 between 20,000 and 35,000 yards depending on the mod while the Mk 13 was credited with 42,000 yards.

The Iowa class had the Mk 13 radar, and their 16 inch guns had greater range than the battleships in the listed encounters.

As the article points out, "those wishing to estimate combat effectiveness of these weapons systems have been forced to resort to the overanalysis of anecdotal or incomplete evidence."

The Samar action can be hard to piece together, but Kurita opened fire at 0658 hrs (times taken from Morison's History of the USN in WWII), and the first escort carrier hit was Kalanin Bay at 0750 hrs. There were straddles and near-misses reported before then, and one source I have read had the USN sailors marvelling at the accuracy of the fire (even though no hits at that point). She was also the only one believed to have been hit by battleship fire, and this was believed to have been 14 or 16 inch (how they would tell I am not sure). This was about the time of Yamato's turn from the torpedoes. The destroyer battle is very confusing. Kurita reported to his fleet that he had sunk a heavy cruiser at 0725. The destroyer Hoel received at battleship hit at 0725, but that was believed to have been from Kongo at a range of 14,000 yards, and she was not sunk at that point.

I grant that sources often contradict each other, as will eye-witnesses. All I am arguing is that the battle evidence for both long range fire of the Yamato and the Iowa is not very conclusive in my opinion.

[Big Kahuna]

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-079.htm looks to be about 300 primary rounds fired. This is a burning slow moving blind target right? Being tracked for a huge amount of time. How many hits? 1% maybe 2% ya think 10%, how many hits does a WWI take and still make speed? I would say 5 or less then 2% of the heavy rounds fired.

The YAMASHIRO steadied on a new course of 260 degrees at 0401, returning fire with every gun she could fire. She was hitting too, scoring several 5.5 inch hits on destroyer ALBERT W. GRANT and near-missing others. Though by now YAMASHIRO was burning so brightly that her secondary gun mounts "stood silhouetted by the flames", she was still making 12 knots. But at 0405 she slowed down suddenly for about three minutes, and the War College was inclined to credit this to a torpedo hit on her starboard side from a torpedo fired at 0359 by USS BENNION. A minute later, the YAMASHIRO straddled USS DENVER, but the slowing battleship was clearly in distress, and the shells falling around increasing. Suddenly, against all odds, a reprieve came. At 0409 Oldendorf got word he was hitting his own ships (the destroyer ALBERT W. GRANT), so gave the order to cease fire. Obviously this was SHIGURE's cue to retire as stated above, and apparently the YAMASHIRO also saw it as an opportunity to regroup. The sudden cease-fire must have, as S.E. Morison wrote, "been seen as God's gift to them and the Emperor". YAMASHIRO turned sharply to port, began to follow MOGAMI south, and defiantly increased speed to 16 knots! One can only marvel at where she got this second-wind from, and indeed her senior survivor opined she might have made good her retirement if not for the torpedoes that struck now.


0411:50: YAMASHIRO hit by two more torpedoes and sinks
Had YAMASHIRO pulled out of radar range, she might yet have met Admiral Shima coming up the strait at high speed and now only ten minutes away. But it was not to be. According to Izaki, an attempt was made to reform with other ships, but while thus engaged, and "facing to the southwest" the YAMASHIRO received a third torpedo hit which struck the starboard engine room. Moments later a fourth torpedo hit the same side aft of the first. Immediately the engines and machinery stopped and YAMASHIRO slowed to a halt. After the fourth torpedo, she began to list "quietly yet steeply", but Admiral Nishimura (who may have been injured) merely stood fast and made no attempt to leave. (It should be noted that the direction of the list is not stated, and despite the side struck, the port list may have increased; hence the NavTech summary which gives a port capsize.).

http://www.combinedfleet.com/atully06.htm

[Heir_Ludendorff]

The Yamato was and still is the largest navel vessel ever constructed. It was longer then the present day USS Enterprise is, so you could say there is some standard WotC scale issues here.

The Yamato's final mission was one it undertook alone. Leaving Japan with only enough fuel for a one way trip it tried to reach Okinawa where it would be beached and used as coastal defense. From the IJN point of view it was a sad day when she was sunk by American aircraft before reaching the island.

[Captain Gideon]

Aren't you forgetting the Light Cruiser Yahagi and 9-Destroyers that went with Yamato on her final voyage.

Captain Gideon

[mikoyan]

The Yamato was and still is the largest navel vessel ever constructed. It was longer then the present day USS Enterprise is, so you could say there is some standard WotC scale issues here.

You could say that, if you were accurate in your statement. The Yamato was 862 feet long. The Enterprise is over 1000. The Missouri is 881 feet long.

The Yamato displaced about 72,000 tonnes
The Missouri - 58,000
The Enterprise - 93,500 tonnes
It would seem they got the scales about right....

[mikoyan]

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-079.htm looks to be about 300 primary rounds fired. This is a burning slow moving blind target right? Being tracked for a huge amount of time. How many hits? 1% maybe 2% ya think 10%, how many hits does a WWI take and still make speed? I would say 5 or less then 2% of the heavy rounds fired.

You are really big on the number of hits aren't you? Naval fire is indirect fire which means it's not terribly precise.

[TK421]

I did a little more digging and indeed, Yamashiro is estimated to have been hit by two to four torpedoes, including two possibles at 0411 hrs. Regardless, she was hit by the battleships fire at over 20,000 yards.

[Big Kahuna]

really? Do you know? Which BB was it? She was hit by many fish and huge amounts of CA and DD fire and was still making speed when hit by two more fish. AND guess what??? Find where I said radar fire control from SIX BB upon a burning, blind, limping target at 21,000 yards with her T crossed could not land a shot? LIKE NOWHERE. I contend and contend and contend there are no examples of radar fire landing long range shots on a moving target and in this exact case has been held up as an example of long range fire, which it is NOT.

As stated above fire above 20,000 yards really is indirect fire and there is no such thing as precisely targeting a empty spot in the ocean where a target may or maybe not anywhere within a mile when the shell lands and even if everything went A OK, the perfect shell fall leaves a hole in the water a little more then a foot in diameter spread out over MANY hundreds of yards, and gee note that many of the USN BB had fired off huge quantities of shells so even if they just left rebuild with new barrel liners their shells would be all over the place from barrel wear.

So yes yes absoluuutely yes, the SIX USN BB at 21,000 yards were in all probability able to land anywhere from 0% to 1% of the shells fired on a spotted, burning, slow moving, LARGE target and that is about the BEST example of radar fire on record in WW II.

Even in the case of the Washington, target direction was probably found via sight. As I have stated before the Washington only fired when the Kirishima was self illuminated and once again this was at close range something like 16,000 yards…

Meanwhile back to the thread, the Yamato along with the Bismarck had excellent optics and were able to land shells at range with no issues at all. In fact the Bismarck used the 1/2 slavo far / near grid bracketing targeting style that would could let her range and then fire at full effect much quicker then any other navy and do so with less ammo, wear and tear and crew fatigue…

[TK421]

There were six USN battleships at Surigao Strait, but their firepower was not evenly distributed. The West Virginia, Tennessee and California were equipped with the Mk 8 radar and fired 93, 69 and 63 rounds of AP respectively (about ten salvoes as my source refers to six-round salvoes).

The other three battleships had Mk 3 radar and encountered difficulties. The Maryland ranged off of West Virginia's salvoes and fired 48 rounds (six salvoes) starting a few minutes later. Mississippi fired one salvoe and Pennsylvania did not fire at all.

This indicates that the Mk 8 radar gave an advantage over the Mk 3. I can't say which battleships hit the Yamashiro, but I am willing to accept that their firepower was effective based on target effects.

Seeing as the discussion is about whether the Iowa warrants Range 5, we should remember that she had the Mk 13 radar and guns with longer range than the ones in these actions. I submit the three radar-engagements as successful examples of radar-controlled gunnery. I grant that applying them to the Iowa requires some faith.

Turning to the Bismark, her range-finding gear and half-salvo method were obviously effective. Bear in mind, however, that the final salvo on the Hood (and perhaps the first one from the Bismark to hit the Hood) was at 16,500 yards. http://www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Bismarck_p1.htm#3 I would say that the the issue of radar vs optical at over 20,000 yards is not necessarily resolved by that engagement.

[Count_Ciano]

Battle of Calabria; Warspite hit Guillio Cesare at 26000 yards.

Battle of Capo Tuelada; Vittorio Veneto managed several damaging "near misses" against the light cruiser Gloucester at 30000 yards!:eek:

Off of Norway; Scharnhorst hit the Glorious ("flipping up her flight deck like a box lid", according to reports) at 26000 yards.

All these were achieved with optical fire. ;)

[Big Kahuna]

Don't forget the Yamato against Taffy3. IMO of course it is the burden of proof is with the Iowa supporters. IMO the Bismarck and the Yamato on a clear day would be at LEAST even on landing hits vs the Iowa, if not just out right better. Either way, it is very hard to land such hits. That why my suggestion would be to count only vital armor at range and that would do 2x damage.... as such hits tend to do a lot of damage. Now the only justification I can make for the Iowa is she fires reasonably fast, she has GREAT speed, and she probably had one of the best trained radar crews. So the SA to 5 represents a ship that could do it all, and a crack crew. I’ve read for instance the Musashi’s crew were very poorly trained and they were ordered to do a 3 month workup after they were deployed because the crew could not handle the AA well nor the primary weapons.

I don’t have the French BB, but I think she had a British Radar set ala KGV. So this is not up to Iowa specs for sure, they have very poor salvo rate and large shell fall scatter.

[TK421]

Count,

Good old Warpsite! Good examples of long-range optically-controlled fire.

Kahuna,

While we have been chasing each other in circles, I do agree with your suggestion on long-range fire. "Plunging" fire, while not as accurate as close-in fire would indeed have the advantage of going through the generally thinner deck armour and getting into vital parts of the ship. I'm also not sure where Richelieu's Range 5 comes from. The Richelieu came in my starter, and I was disappointed. I'd have rather got a Kongo for historical reasons.