RangerDane
08-08-2007, 03:47 PM
This should make an interesting scenario:
Battle of Balikpapan:
At 0248 hours on January 24, 1942, under a shroud of thick, black smoke from burning oil fields and amid the wreckage of bombed Japanese transports, Commander Paul H. Talbot, the commanding officer of Destroyer Squadron 59 (Desron 59), ordered his four elderly destroyers to attack Japanese transports and their covering force at Balikpapan Bay off Borneo, in the Dutch East Indies. On January 21, after securing both coasts of northern Borneo, the Japanese launched a strike force of 18 transports, two destroyers and two patrol boats from Tarakan with the intent of invading and occupying the oil-rich port of Balikpapan, located in the Makassar Strait. The invasion force was to be protected by Admiral Shoji Nishimura's support force, which consisted of the light cruiser Naka and seven ships of Destroyer Squadron 4. In transit, the Japanese force was subjected to air and submarine attacks from both American and Dutch units. These attacks sank the transports Nana Maru and Jukka Maru on January 23, but did not prevent the Japanese from reaching the landing area off Balikpapan at approximately 2000 on January 23.
Nishimura anchored his transports in two lines and placed his covering force in a line abreast of Balikpapan Bay. The Japanese ships were silhouetted by the burning oil fields that the Dutch had torched as they retreated. With flames and smoke as background, the destroyers of Desron 59 prepared to engage in battle.
During the afternoon of January 20, Talbot, tasked with preventing the Japanese landing, had issued his orders for the impending action: "Initial weapon will be torps [torpedoes]. Vice Adm. William Glassford, the American strike force commander, had only Boise, Marblehead and four destroyers at his disposal.
When the Japanese thrust toward Balikpapan was discovered, Glassford's force left Kupang Bay, off Timor, to intercept and attack the enemy. En route, the small force was further reduced when Boise struck an uncharted reef on January 21, and Marblehead lost the use of one turbine and was reduced to a speed of 15 knots. Glassford shifted his flag to Marblehead and ordered the two damaged cruisers to return to port. Their departure meant that the American force had lost most of its heavy firepower before it had even reached the enemy.
After receiving orders from Hart to continue with the mission despite Glassford's departure, the destroyers resumed their approach to Balikpapan. At 2315 distant lights were sighted and General Quarters was sounded. The destroyers were in column formation, with Ford in the lead, followed by Pope, Parrott and Paul Jones, as they began their final run to the Japanese landing area. As the US destroyers approached the landing site, lights flashed, apparently a challenge from a Japanese ship. The American ships immediately changed course. At 0248 Talbot gave the order "Follow me" on the talk-between-ships system, and the destroyers charged into action. The first U.S. destroyer to fire was Parrott, which launched five torpedoes at the dim shape of a ship about 500 to 1,000 yards off her starboard side. The torpedoes missed, but Parrott then fired three torpedoes from her port battery at a large ship off her port side at a range of approximately 4,000 to 6,000 yards. At 0300 the destroyers changed course to 170 degrees. Two minutes later Parrott's torpedoes struck Samanura Maru, which exploded, according to Parrott's battle report, with "flames reaching 500 feet in height."
As the ships completed their turn, all four launched torpedoes at Japanese ships anchored off their starboard, at ranges of 2,000 to 4,000 yards. The American sailors saw a large explosion as Tatsukami Maru was fatally hit by Parrott and Paul Jones. In just 13 minutes the American force had sunk two merchantmen. They were now loose among the anchored transports. It was a destroyer captain's dream. The Japanese, meanwhile, were confused about what was happening. Some Japanese ship commanders thought they were under air attack and took appropriate action. Nishimura, however, believed he was being attacked by submarines and ordered his destroyers into the strait to look for nonexistent subs, leaving the transports at the mercy of the American destroyers.
At 0314 the Americans turned 270 degrees to starboard to close their range to the anchored transports. At 0319 Pope and Parrott fired five torpedoes from their port batteries at a ship believed to be a destroyer. The unlucky ship was the Japanese patrol craft PC-37, which exploded and sank.
At approximately 0322 both Ford and Paul Jones launched torpedoes at a target to port, the 5,000-ton Kuretake Maru, which blew up and sank. Talbot now ordered his destroyers to turn to port toward the anchored ships. At 0335 the destroyers again began crossing the two lines of anchored Japanese transports, but--due to poor visibility caused by the burning ships and petroleum smoke--the destroyer formation began to dissolve. Parrott and Paul Jones headed to starboard again to avoid a reported minefield and turned south to the prearranged rendezvous point. This meant that while the battle was still raging, half the American force had disengaged and headed seaward.
Ten minutes later, Ford sighted the wreckage of a Japanese ship and changed course to 320 degrees. Accompanied by Pope, Ford charged the second line of anchored ships. Ford attacked Asahi Maru off her starboard side with gunfire and the 7,000-ton Tsuruga Maru with gunfire and a torpedo. American sailors soon observed a large explosion on the port side of the Japanese merchantman. Pope had followed Ford for a short time after Parrott and Paul Jones had turned south, but at 0340, according to her action report, "Ford slowed and stopped, reporting by voice radio that she believed that she was going to enter the minefield. Pope turned sharply to port to avoid hitting Ford. The column then broke up and gunfire was temporarily checked for fear of hitting our own ships." Pope then turned south and at 0350 established contact with Parrott and joined in column astern of her and Paul Jones. At 0347 Ford received the only battle damage reported by the American force when a 3-inch shell struck the ship in the torpedo workshop, injuring four seamen. After this intense action, Ford turned to port and headed to the open sea to rejoin her sister ships.
The action reports reveal the battle's swift nature. There is no evidence that any Japanese navy ship fired either a shell or torpedo during the attack. Armed Japanese merchantmen did return fire and apparently scored Nishimura's only hit on the Americans.
Admiral Nishimura's believed that any attack would come from the east, and when he received a report of approaching enemy ships from one of the minesweepers, he moved his flagship, Naka, and a destroyer division to the east, leaving his transports to be protected by patrol craft and minesweepers. Nishimura may have had some justification in believing initially that his force was under submarine attack, because the Dutch submarine K-18 had sunk the transport Tsuruga Maru around midnight, and the Japanese later claimed to have sunk a submarine. But whatever justification Nishimura had for some of his actions, he performed poorly, achieving the dubious distinction of being the first Japanese commander to lose a surface action during World War II.
The American victory neither delayed the Japanese advance into the Dutch East Indies, nor, in any strategic sense, had much effect on the outcome of the war.
The Battle of Balikpapan, while not as significant as Jutland or Lepanto, was a daring and aggressive action that proved to the U.S. Navy that the Japanese were not invincible. Although the first six months of 1942 was a dark time for the United States, the remarkable success of the destroyers of Desron 59 at Balikpapan was the first glimpse of the U.S. Navy's fighting ability.
Battle of Balikpapan:
At 0248 hours on January 24, 1942, under a shroud of thick, black smoke from burning oil fields and amid the wreckage of bombed Japanese transports, Commander Paul H. Talbot, the commanding officer of Destroyer Squadron 59 (Desron 59), ordered his four elderly destroyers to attack Japanese transports and their covering force at Balikpapan Bay off Borneo, in the Dutch East Indies. On January 21, after securing both coasts of northern Borneo, the Japanese launched a strike force of 18 transports, two destroyers and two patrol boats from Tarakan with the intent of invading and occupying the oil-rich port of Balikpapan, located in the Makassar Strait. The invasion force was to be protected by Admiral Shoji Nishimura's support force, which consisted of the light cruiser Naka and seven ships of Destroyer Squadron 4. In transit, the Japanese force was subjected to air and submarine attacks from both American and Dutch units. These attacks sank the transports Nana Maru and Jukka Maru on January 23, but did not prevent the Japanese from reaching the landing area off Balikpapan at approximately 2000 on January 23.
Nishimura anchored his transports in two lines and placed his covering force in a line abreast of Balikpapan Bay. The Japanese ships were silhouetted by the burning oil fields that the Dutch had torched as they retreated. With flames and smoke as background, the destroyers of Desron 59 prepared to engage in battle.
During the afternoon of January 20, Talbot, tasked with preventing the Japanese landing, had issued his orders for the impending action: "Initial weapon will be torps [torpedoes]. Vice Adm. William Glassford, the American strike force commander, had only Boise, Marblehead and four destroyers at his disposal.
When the Japanese thrust toward Balikpapan was discovered, Glassford's force left Kupang Bay, off Timor, to intercept and attack the enemy. En route, the small force was further reduced when Boise struck an uncharted reef on January 21, and Marblehead lost the use of one turbine and was reduced to a speed of 15 knots. Glassford shifted his flag to Marblehead and ordered the two damaged cruisers to return to port. Their departure meant that the American force had lost most of its heavy firepower before it had even reached the enemy.
After receiving orders from Hart to continue with the mission despite Glassford's departure, the destroyers resumed their approach to Balikpapan. At 2315 distant lights were sighted and General Quarters was sounded. The destroyers were in column formation, with Ford in the lead, followed by Pope, Parrott and Paul Jones, as they began their final run to the Japanese landing area. As the US destroyers approached the landing site, lights flashed, apparently a challenge from a Japanese ship. The American ships immediately changed course. At 0248 Talbot gave the order "Follow me" on the talk-between-ships system, and the destroyers charged into action. The first U.S. destroyer to fire was Parrott, which launched five torpedoes at the dim shape of a ship about 500 to 1,000 yards off her starboard side. The torpedoes missed, but Parrott then fired three torpedoes from her port battery at a large ship off her port side at a range of approximately 4,000 to 6,000 yards. At 0300 the destroyers changed course to 170 degrees. Two minutes later Parrott's torpedoes struck Samanura Maru, which exploded, according to Parrott's battle report, with "flames reaching 500 feet in height."
As the ships completed their turn, all four launched torpedoes at Japanese ships anchored off their starboard, at ranges of 2,000 to 4,000 yards. The American sailors saw a large explosion as Tatsukami Maru was fatally hit by Parrott and Paul Jones. In just 13 minutes the American force had sunk two merchantmen. They were now loose among the anchored transports. It was a destroyer captain's dream. The Japanese, meanwhile, were confused about what was happening. Some Japanese ship commanders thought they were under air attack and took appropriate action. Nishimura, however, believed he was being attacked by submarines and ordered his destroyers into the strait to look for nonexistent subs, leaving the transports at the mercy of the American destroyers.
At 0314 the Americans turned 270 degrees to starboard to close their range to the anchored transports. At 0319 Pope and Parrott fired five torpedoes from their port batteries at a ship believed to be a destroyer. The unlucky ship was the Japanese patrol craft PC-37, which exploded and sank.
At approximately 0322 both Ford and Paul Jones launched torpedoes at a target to port, the 5,000-ton Kuretake Maru, which blew up and sank. Talbot now ordered his destroyers to turn to port toward the anchored ships. At 0335 the destroyers again began crossing the two lines of anchored Japanese transports, but--due to poor visibility caused by the burning ships and petroleum smoke--the destroyer formation began to dissolve. Parrott and Paul Jones headed to starboard again to avoid a reported minefield and turned south to the prearranged rendezvous point. This meant that while the battle was still raging, half the American force had disengaged and headed seaward.
Ten minutes later, Ford sighted the wreckage of a Japanese ship and changed course to 320 degrees. Accompanied by Pope, Ford charged the second line of anchored ships. Ford attacked Asahi Maru off her starboard side with gunfire and the 7,000-ton Tsuruga Maru with gunfire and a torpedo. American sailors soon observed a large explosion on the port side of the Japanese merchantman. Pope had followed Ford for a short time after Parrott and Paul Jones had turned south, but at 0340, according to her action report, "Ford slowed and stopped, reporting by voice radio that she believed that she was going to enter the minefield. Pope turned sharply to port to avoid hitting Ford. The column then broke up and gunfire was temporarily checked for fear of hitting our own ships." Pope then turned south and at 0350 established contact with Parrott and joined in column astern of her and Paul Jones. At 0347 Ford received the only battle damage reported by the American force when a 3-inch shell struck the ship in the torpedo workshop, injuring four seamen. After this intense action, Ford turned to port and headed to the open sea to rejoin her sister ships.
The action reports reveal the battle's swift nature. There is no evidence that any Japanese navy ship fired either a shell or torpedo during the attack. Armed Japanese merchantmen did return fire and apparently scored Nishimura's only hit on the Americans.
Admiral Nishimura's believed that any attack would come from the east, and when he received a report of approaching enemy ships from one of the minesweepers, he moved his flagship, Naka, and a destroyer division to the east, leaving his transports to be protected by patrol craft and minesweepers. Nishimura may have had some justification in believing initially that his force was under submarine attack, because the Dutch submarine K-18 had sunk the transport Tsuruga Maru around midnight, and the Japanese later claimed to have sunk a submarine. But whatever justification Nishimura had for some of his actions, he performed poorly, achieving the dubious distinction of being the first Japanese commander to lose a surface action during World War II.
The American victory neither delayed the Japanese advance into the Dutch East Indies, nor, in any strategic sense, had much effect on the outcome of the war.
The Battle of Balikpapan, while not as significant as Jutland or Lepanto, was a daring and aggressive action that proved to the U.S. Navy that the Japanese were not invincible. Although the first six months of 1942 was a dark time for the United States, the remarkable success of the destroyers of Desron 59 at Balikpapan was the first glimpse of the U.S. Navy's fighting ability.